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Abstract 
Founded on a prosopographical analysis of the European Commission¹s top civil servants, this paper 
gathers data in order to contribute to the analysis of the European legal capital in two ways. First, we 
show that while jurists (i.e. agents for whom law was the main element of their training) integrated the 
European Commission administration very early on, and acquired dominant positions, they were 
strong only insofar as their legal training was the basis of a broader undertaking of construction and 
acquisition of a more general bureaucratic capital. Secondly, we demonstrate that this ability to hold 
dominant positions within the machine tends to be increasingly contested with the rise of other agents, 
especially economists, whose properties tend to become indispensable for a high level career within 
the European Commission.  
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Introduction* 
This contribution aims at grasping the forms and the weight of legal training and beyond that, of “legal 
capital” (Vauchez, 2008), in the specific case of the top officials of the European Commission. From 
our point of view, this group constitutes a valuable analytical tool in order to tackle two closely related 
(but not similar) questions. 
First, studying their background enables us to contribute to the study of the European legal field, by 
shedding light on a specific area in that space. This area is characterized by the strong degree of 
permanence of the social agents and simultaneously, by the fact that their credit is based not so much 
on the possession and implementation of a “legal capital” as on the embodiment of bureaucratic 
excellence. In other words, the professionals of law there are seldom “pure jurists” (Dezalay, 1990), 
unlike in other areas of the European legal space. While they do possess legal capital, it mostly has 
significance in a hybrid form, transformed by their practice as top officials, or as an underlying 
dimension of the bureaucratic capital (Bourdieu, 1996) these agents acquire and, to some extent, invent. 
The study of top officials also allows to introduce a question that is broader than that of the legal 
field, even though it is evidently related to it. Indeed, it allows to put forward indicators on the 
variation of legal capital and its relative value in the European institutional space. Far from 
constituting a homogeneous entity, the Commission’s top officials first of all map out a space of 
positions structured by the unequal distribution of capital, more or less national or international, 
sectoral and political. This space is also a space of struggles, within which agents fight over the 
definition of the legitimate properties to represent the figure of the top European official. In this sense, 
the study of the top European officials helps to analyse how legal capital is an instrument, or even a 
stake, in these struggles.1 
The population of the Commission’s top officials is also exemplary in that it has changed over 
time. These changes are related to the construction of a bureaucratic capital specific to the EU, 
referred to as “European institutional capital” (Georgakakis, de Lassalle, 2006 and 2007). While 
nothing suggests a priori that the capital possessed by Community elites is exceptional, it bears 
pointing out than more than fifty years of bureaucratic history of the Commission have enabled a 
relative integration of its higher administrative elites. This integration is objectivated in preferential 
paths (long internal careers within the Commission, acquisition of a credit specific to the institution, 
valorisation of European distinctions and awards against those liable to act as national markers, etc.). 
Furthermore, this construction is not entirely autonomous, i.e. completely independent from the 
processes of transformation of national bureaucratic capital, and officials make for good indicators of 
the variations in the place of law and legal training in the formation of bureaucratic capital, or of its 
increasing decline observed by many analysts. 
Founded on more general prosopographical analysis (see Georgakakis, de Lassalle 2004 and 2007 
for a more general presentation of the investigation protocol and below for some details), this paper 
gathers data in order to give a few elements to reply to the questions raised above. It shows for 
instance that while jurists (i.e. agents for whom law was the main element of their training) integrated 
the European Commission very early on, and, at least for some time, acquired dominant positions 
within that institution, they were strong only insofar as their legal training was the basis of a broader 
undertaking of construction and acquisition of a bureaucratic credit within which the properties of 
                                                     
*  This paper was originally presented at the Conference “The European Legal Field-Le champ juridique européen” 
organized by Bruno de Witte and Antoine Vauchez with the Robert Schuman Centre and the Academy of European Law 
(European University Institute, 25-26 September 2008). 
1.  We will not expand on the definitions of the concepts of “field” or “capital” in Bourdieu’s theory. See for 
instance Bourdieu, 1998. For a broader presentation of Bourdieu’s concepts and their application to the EU, 
see Kauppi, 2005. 
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jurists are either marginal in their original form or watered down. Moreover, this ability to hold 
dominant positions within the machine tended to be placed in competition with the rise of other 
agents, among whom were economists, whose properties tend to become indispensable for a high level 
career within the Commission. 
 
This study on the Directors-General and Deputy Directors-General of the European 
Commission is part of a research programme developed since 2001 by the Centre for 
European Political Socioiogy (GSPE-PRISME, MISHA, CNRS-University of 
Strasbourg) on “European elites”. This programme consists in constituting a database on 
Commissioners, Directors-General, Deputy Directors-General in Directorates-General 
and in the General Secretariat of the European Commission, as well as the main positions 
in the European Parliament (Presidents, Vice-Presidents, Quaestors, Presidents of 
committees and groups). This database now gathers more than 600 entries including “bio-
social” data (age, gender, place of birth, nationality, marital status, etc.), information on 
careers (positions successively held), diplomas and places of training, engagements (in 
associations, political, European), publications and decorations. We currently have 220 
biographies on Directors-General and Deputy Directors-General. 
Before we proceed to analyse this data, a few limitations specific to the analysis of 
training should be mentioned. An interesting aspect of biographical directories is the fact 
that they contain auto-definitions, thereby revealing the symbolic value that the agents 
attribute to their successive titles or positions, which makes for a good indicator of the 
construction process of a credit. However, there are also major limitations. In the 
available directories, family properties are very seldom mentioned, and while rewards 
obtained outside the institution are occasionally highlighted, top officials tend to valorise, 
whenever possible, their path within the institution. This is one of the specificities of 
bureaucratic capital compared to other positions that are more individualised, such as 
judges or lawyers. It is indeed quite arduous, unless one carries out further biographical 
investigation through other means, to work on legal capital, as Charle defines it (Charle, 
1997). We will then rather focus on training, which entails other difficulties. 
Unlike French top officials (for whom degrees are essential), European top officials tend 
not to particularly highlight their educational achievements and competences, especially 
in the European dictionaries we consulted.2 This paradox has sociological reasons: 
degrees are national markers and the access to top European public sector positions is tied 
with the claim to defend a European general interest. The reason why they are 
increasingly mentioned now is precisely that the processes of de-nationalisation of paths 
have been underway long enough so that these national markers do not harm the agents’ 
strategic identity. Moreover, the shaping of strategic identities takes on extremely diverse 
national forms. For instance, while in France degrees and places of training are important 
for educational and social certification and are always mentioned in biographical notices, 
in Great Britain Colleges prevail as social certification. As a result, we know a lot about 
the places of training of British top officials, but we have few elements on their fields of 
education. These various limitations have of course been taken into account in this study.  
I. Legal training as a component of bureaucratic capital 
Among the roles that have contributed to the legitimisation of the Commission as one of the key 
institutions of European construction, its strictly legal functions (“guardian of the treaties”, “initiator 
of legislation”, “regulating organisation”, etc.) are central. Hence, many observers create a link 
between these functions, the weight of jurists within the Commission, and the importance of the legal 
                                                     
2.  It bears mentioning that comparisons with national Who’s Who volumes are generally not feasible, as the officials are 
seldom included in them, except for parachutés, who remain however in the minority.  
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culture that supposedly prevails there (Stevens, 2001). However, these functionalist interpretations 
neglect what seems to be one of the characteristic elements of the specific weight and value of this 
legal culture. While we may agree with these authors in acknowledging the fact that many jurists 
integrated the administration of the European Commission and for a long time constituted the majority 
of its staff, they have done so not so much to create a “place of law”, or a stronghold of the nascent 
Community law, but rather to implement a strategy of foundation of an executive that was both social 
and institutional (on this point see also, Shore 2001). In this respect, it is very striking to see that the 
mention of a specialisation in a field of EU law is particularly absent in the biographical notices and 
CVs we have consulted, as is the claim to produce or at least to disseminate a specific law 
(Community law) or one of its sectoral applications (e.g. competition law). Publications are more 
frequent on the theme of European administration than on more strictly legal themes. While legal 
training has doubtless represented one of the bases of this undertaking, it has not played that role per 
se, but rather within the framework of a broader undertaking of construction of bureaucratic capital 
liable to develop a European administration, and in the process, assert themselves as the best servants 
of this administration. 
Jurists have unarguably been the first to hold top positions in the European Commission. Except 
for the position of Secretary-General, which was for a long time held by former ENS student Emile 
Noel, jurists have held most key positions in the administration. This is the case for Directorates-
General (DGs) with a strong legal dimension such as DG Internal Market and DG Competition (Pieter 
Verloren Von Themat, Willy Slieder), and obviously of the legal service, but also of transversal DGs 
such as administration and budget. More surprisingly perhaps, DGs such as Economic Affairs have, at 
least in early stages, relied on their competence. Indeed, Helmut Allardt, the first director of Economic 
Affairs, was a jurist, as were the two Italians who succeeded him in that position, Franco Bobba and 
Ugo Mosca. Other DGs such as the current DG External Relations – possibly at the request of Walter 
Hallstein, himself a diplomat and jurist specialised in international law – have been managed by jurists 
for a long time. 
Their placement in these positions appears nevertheless less as the fruit of a strategy of group 
placement in and for itself – jurists for jurists – than as the product of a more long-term process of 
development of an administration conform, viable and comparable to member states’ administrations. 
The conflicts that have opposed the Hallstein Commission to certain member states, particularly 
France, are well known and have had noticeable consequences. In the early stages where state pressure 
on the positions was still rather weak, the strategies of appointment of top officials entailed a process 
of cooptation involving Hallstein and Noel quite directly. The latter tried to surround themselves with 
a staff that presented guarantees not only of European know-how, as has been often pointed out, but 
especially of an incontestable bureaucratic competence. Indeed, the Prussian model of the jurist 
serving the “superior interest” (Daviet-Vincent, 2005), seemed to offer resources in terms of loyalty 
both inside and outside the institution. Member states have then had more influence in the 
appointments, but only within the framework of compromises with the president and the Secretary 
General of the Commission, which have contributed to reproduce the general orientation of these 
appointments. 
This first analysis of the foundations of this administration thus contains a broader lesson on the 
particularities of the presence of jurists in the Commission. The legal dimension of the profiles of 
these top officials is linked to the reproduction, and probably to the partial European conversion, of 
ultimately rather ordinary forms of a national bureaucratic capital which lies in most founding states 
on legal competence. Generally speaking, there are common features between top European officials 
and their national counterparts in terms of training. On a more specific national case-by-case approach, 
the relationship of homology that they share should be pointed out. The German case constitutes a 
good example. Often endowed with more legal capital than others, German top officials are 
characterised by their high proportion of law PhDs – i.e. the title that was for a long time necessary in 
order to reach the most prestigious positions in the German civil service. Therefore, the DGs directed 
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by Germans were for a long time directed by jurists (among others, DG External Relations and 
Competition). The same goes for Italians and Luxembourgers in the DG Internal Market. Conversely, 
the British officials who arrived at the European Commission a little later were not “jurists”, like in 
Great Britain.3  
While this relationship of homology enables to understand that the jurist profile tends towards 
construction and accumulation by the institution and its members of a bureaucratic capital, it would be 
wrong to link this dimension solely to this relationship of homology. If legal capital is here integrated 
into bureaucratic capital, it is also the fruit of a strategic behaviour, understood not as a tactical move 
but as a long-term social strategy of construction of a social space and of their position within that space. 
This dimension can be first of all perceived in the way jurists have presented themselves for a long 
time. We have underlined the deficiencies of our sources earlier; all signs point towards their existence 
as a fruit of strategies of self-presentation from the officials. When they mention their legal training, 
the top officials of the Commission do not indulge in a display of titles liable to distinguish them 
according to their legal competence. Indeed, one would think that the place where the degree was 
obtained (a potential indicator of its value for sociologists as well as for other readers of the 
biographies) is systematically mentioned. The majority of those who mention it are those who value a 
foreign cursus honorum (members of “small countries” who have studied in a university from a “big 
country”, members of a “big country” aiming to play down their national ties, etc.). Similarly, 
imprecision on the nature of the legal training reveals the meaning taken on by the mention of said 
training. If the latter is certainly minimum evidence of bureaucratic value, the point is mostly to avoid 
distinguishing one’s competence as nationally marked, i.e. the mentions of public, private, etc. – 
except for those of jurist in international law or compared law, precisely the ones that appear most often. 
This dimension should be placed in the context of a broader process of stylisation, and beyond that 
of manufacturing and increasing autonomy of European bureaucratic capital. As has been observed 
elsewhere, in the course of European construction there have been forms of differentiation of the paths 
of top officials, as careers involve stages that are increasingly specific to this space, i.e. for instance 
experience as member of cabinet of a Commissioner, substantial “in-house” experience and multiple 
sectoral experiences – the transversality that comes out of that confers a particularly valuable 
“generalist” credit. 
This has consequences in terms of training of top officials. Among the Directorates held by jurists 
(External Relations, Competition, Internal Market, Administration and of course Legal Service), none 
is in majority, regardless of circumstances, composed of “pure” jurists. Most other DGs are otherwise 
increasingly marked by double competences. The double competence Law/Social science therefore 
prevails in the DG Social Affairs and Employment, as Political science/Law does in the DG 
Information. Beyond these atypical cases, the double competence Law/Economy prevails as the norm 
everywhere. This double competence often becomes an individualised norm (double degree), 
complemented by a second degree abroad. 
This materialises in the career of jurists who occupy positions of Director-General or Deputy 
Director-General in the current Commission. For instance, the German Matthias Ruete obtained law 
degrees in Germany (PhD) and in London (LLM). After these national and foreign experiences, he 
went on to be a lecturer in Germany and then in the University of Warwick, Coventry; and then started 
a “typical” career in the Commission. Originally an administrator in the Social Affairs and Internal 
Market DGs, he became Head of Unit in the DG industry. Following this transversal experience he 
became a member of the Research Commissioner’s cabinet. He then did another multisectoral “round” 
as Director (DG Energy, then Enlargement and Enterprise) and eventually became Director-General 
                                                     
3.  The French case is slightly different: for reasons owing to the fact that French governments at first invested in 
other institutions than those of the common market, the elites that integrated the Commission tended to be 
secondary, or even “counter-elites” under Gaullism.  
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for Transports and Energy. Françoise Le Bail had a similar career: a doctor in law and a lawyer, she 
soon abandoned her career as a jurist to integrate the DG Relex and became a spokesperson for the 
Belgian Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, and then worked in Christiane Scriveners’s cabinet. She 
was then advisor and Director in the DG Commerce, and became spokesperson for the President of the 
Commission and Deputy Director-General of DG Enterprise. 
This construction of a specific bureaucratic capital, quite different from that of law producers and 
comparable to that of staff from Courts, for instance, can finally be seen in the remarkable career 
evolutions of legal service members, which demonstrate the increasing integration of legal capital in 
“in-house” institutional capital. 
The first directors-general’s capital was clearly typical of French top officials. Michel Gaudet, who 
completed his studies in the late 1930s/early 1940s, graduated from the Ecole libre des sciences 
politiques, has degrees in private and public law, was an auditor in the French Council of State, Legal 
Adviser of the French protectorate in Morocco in 1945, Maître des Requêtes in 1945, Head of Cabinet 
for Lionel de Tinguy (State secretary for economic affairs from 1945 to 1950), Legal Adviser of the 
ECSC High Authority in 1952, DG of the legal service of the European executives in 1958, and 
director of the legal service of the Commission up to 1969. Jean-Louis Dewost (BA in law, Economy 
degree, graduate from the Institute of Political Science in Paris and the ENA), Director-General of the 
Commission’s Legal Service, was successively senior civil servant in France (Manager of the 
documentation centre of the Council of State, Auditor in the Council of State, President of the social 
section of the Council of State) and in the legal services of European institutions (DDG in the 
Council’s Legal Service, DG of the Commission’s Legal Service). Things change with Michel Petite. 
Born in 1947, he has a degree in private and public law, and indicates he is a Law professor in the 
universities of Paris and Orléans, and a lawyer at the Paris bar. While he entered the Commission in 
1979, his career there was that of a “typical” European official, alternating between positions in the 
Commission’s DGs (administrator in the DG Industry and Internal Market between 1974 and 1984, 
then Head of Unit in Competition in 1990-91, and finally director at the Amsterdam IGC and Director 
for State Aid in the DG Competition between 1995 and 1999), and in cabinets (member of Lord 
Cockfield’s cabinet from 1985 to 1988, Deputy Head of Cabinet for Christiane Scrivener in 1989-90, 
member then Head of Cabinet of two Presidents of the Commission, Jacques Delors and Romano 
Prodi from 1991 to 1995 and from 1999 to 2001). Only after having held all these positions did he 
come to direct the Legal Service in 2001. The case of Claire-Françoise Durand is also that of a career 
entirely constituted within the Commission, even though she has less of a generalist profile than her 
predecessors. With a Law PhD obtained in Paris II University and a Masters in Law at Yale, she 
integrated the Commission through Competition, and then in the Legal Service, she was successively 
Administrator (6 years), Assistant to the Director-General (8 years), Director (9 years), Deputy 
Director and acting Director-General.  
II. Legal training as contested capital 
While the process of construction of a bureaucracy in which jurists are involved, and which 
contributes to ensure their position, tends towards a dilution of their properties as jurists, this dilution 
also depends on a broader process whereby their long lasting dominant position is increasingly 
contested by others, especially economists. This should not be seen only as an external effect of the 
large European market, as we will see below.  
This dimension can first of all be seen in the figures. In the first two phases of European 
construction (1958-1985), jurists prevailed over economists. Although those figures should be 
considered with caution, in light of the high percentage of N/A, there were 25% of jurist against 18% 
of economists. This balance was reversed after 1985. Under the Delors presidency, there was a surge 
in the number of economists (almost 38%), whereas there were fewer jurists. By 1996 the balance was 
less unequal (22.5% of “pure” jurists, 28.5% of “pure” economists), but most strikingly, in this new 
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period, the sense of balance that seemed to characterize holders of this new bureaucratic capital tends 
to disappear. There is still a significant proportion of jurists who add an economy degree to their law 
degree, but the opposite is no longer true. While economists have studied law between 1973 and 1986, 
this double competence was less and less found after 1986.  
Proportion of DGs with training in law or economics according to period 
The FREQ Procedure 
Frequency  
Row Pct  
 
Table of period by studies 
Training 
Period other  law Law+ / eco- Law- / eco+ eco N/A  Total 
1958-73 4 
10.53 
9
23.68 
1
2.63 
0
0.00 
7 
18.42 
17 
44.74 
38
  
1973-85 15 
25.86 
13
22.41 
2
3.45 
3
5.17 
7 
12.07 
18 
31.03 
58
  
1985-95 10 
22.22 
8
17.78 
3
6.67 
3
6.67 
14 
31.11 
7 
15.56 
45
  
1996-2005 26 
24.53 
24
22.64 
7
6.60 
1
0.94 
30 
28.30 
18 
16.98 
106
  
Total  55 54 13 7 58 60 247 
 
 
This evolution is confirmed by the analysis of the degrees held by the Directors-General of the 
current Commission. Economic training appears to prevail durably over legal training. Two thirds of 
the current Directors-General are indeed graduates of economics (14 out of 21), whereas only 4 out of 
21 are jurists. Law degrees are also generally complemented by another competence (College of 
Europe for Faull, international administration for Manservisi, or human and social sciences for 
Quintin), which is less the case for economists. 
 
Degrees held by the Directors-General of the current Commission 
DG Press and Communication (Sorensen) Masters in economic sciences 
DG EcFin (Buti) Masters in economic sciences 
DG Enterprise  (Zourek) Degree in economics – Univ. of Vienna 
DG ADMIN (Chêne) Degree in economic sciences and European 
economics (Nancy II) 
DG JHA (Faull) BA in law/French Univ. of Sussex and Geneva + 
College of Europe  
Environment (Carl) MA in economics (Cambridge), MBA INSEAD 
(Fontainebleau) 
Regional Policy  (Ahner) PhD in economics 
Internal Market  (Holmqvist) Degree in economics – Univ. of Stockholm 
Budget (Gray) Chartered accountant  
DG Employment (Van der Pas) BA in commercial and consular sciences 
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Degrees held by the Directors-General of the current Commission 
Health and consumer protection Magdalen Oxford College +ENA 
Enlargement (Leigh) PhD, political science 
DG Energy (Ruette) Masters in law – Univ. of London, Phd in law  
Competition (Lowe) M.SC London Business School 
DG Agriculture (Demarty) Rural agricultural engineering, Polytechnique 
Relex (Landaburru) BA in law + Licence de droit + DEA in political 
economics - Nanterre 
DG Mare (Fotiadis)  PhD in economics – Univ. of Freiburg 
Education (Quintin) Degree in public law and political science, CES 
de Lettres 
Commerce (O’Sullivan) BA in economics and Sociology, College of 
Europe 
DG Information society and media (Colasanti) Degree in economics – Univ. in Rome + College 
of Europe 
Development (Manservisi) Degree in law, DESS International 
Administration  
 
Economists have also increasingly occupied important positions in the major DGs where jurists 
were formerly prevalent, such as Competition, External Relations, Regional Policy. 
While economists are more often “pure” economists, we should not disregard the fact that they are 
also involved in similar strategies of accumulation of a specific institutional capital. These entail the 
same types of resources (double competence, but not always in law, international training, sometimes 
in a university of another member state, or in the US, experience in various cabinets and directorates). 
David O’Sullivan, Director-General for Commerce, is an economist and sociologist who graduated 
from the College of Europe. He also worked in the DGs Relex, EAC, Social affairs, and within 
cabinets (Peter Sutherland, Padraig Flynn and Romano Prodi). Similar tendencies can be observed for 
more sectoral profiles. Marco Buti, laureate in economics and commerce from the University of 
Florence, holds a Masters degree in research on economics (M.Phil) from the University of Oxford.  
He has published numerous books and articles on the EMU, progressively climbed the hierarchic 
ladder in the DG Economy and Finance (economist, head of unit, director, then Deputy Director-
General), and also held positions in cabinets (Pandolfi, then Vanni d’Archifari) which enabled him to 
become Deputy Director-General and Director-General. 
Agents with other profiles have also become increasingly present – from around 10% originally to 
more than 25% now. They are very diverse and can be separated into two groups: graduates in 
political and social sciences (this has varying values in member states) and technicians or engineers 
(physicians, agronomists, etc.) 
While this reversal cannot be seen as a victory of economists over jurists, the decrease of legal 
training in the European Commission remains to be interpreted. 
Two hypotheses seem to prevail. The first, a functionalist one, asserts the existence of a necessity 
related to the construction of the single market. The second one, influenced by Marxism, consists in 
saying that because it is a “superstructure”, the administration of the Commission only reflects a 
sociological evolution that can be observed everywhere, in every European country. Broadly speaking, 
there is an element of truth to both hypotheses, but they neglect more internal explanations, linked to 
the specific dynamics of the construction of the group and the social and political strategies used to 
invest this group. 
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In this perspective, we put forward three elements for explanation. First, as we have suggested 
above, the decrease of law is due to the jurists themselves, who have invested this bureaucratic space. 
Either, in the same way that they have contributed to its foundation, they have converted themselves to 
their institution, which influences them in return, as the evolution of their individual paths shows Or, 
in order to maintain their positions – not so much according to a deliberate strategy of control of 
positions, but rather to successfully accomplish their sectoral missions – they have attempted to make 
alliances with others, for example by recruiting economists (and others). In the case of Competition, 
the interview with Roger Simonet, former Deputy Director-General for Fishing and then for 
Competition, provides insights on this: 
“Well, Competition, actually, I discovered it… DG Competition, at first when I arrived I sort of… 
wasn’t very well considered because I don’t come from Competition. (…) Competition was a DG 
with a bit of a narrow vision, that is, a purely legal vision and that shocked me, and when I was put 
in charge of very important cases, with Elermann, we understood we had to change a little, I’m not 
saying the orientation, because it was always very specific, with him I try to open Competition to a 
reflection on the economy. So as people left, we made arrangements to recruit economists in 
priority. But competition still retained a strong legal specialisation, very strictly legal. And with 
Elermann (…) we tried to breathe new life into the DG, by having people think beyond purely 
legal aspects – what is the future of Europe regarding industrialisation? And since then (…) DG 
Competition has been open-minded enough to deal with Americans better, especially in terms of 
very important world issues.”  
As we have mentioned above, these economists have themselves accumulated bureaucratic capital 
specific to the institution – as a result, they have to some extent taken the place formerly held by the jurists. 
A second element for explanation has to do with the successive enlargements, which have enabled 
the integration in the Commission of top officials whose bureaucratic model is not structured by law, 
unlike in the case of Germany, for instance. This is first of all the case of British, Danish and Irish 
officials. The first British Directors-General were indeed all non-jurists. Raymond Appleyard, first 
British D-G of the DG Information, after having taught and researched in physics and biology in 
Canada and the US, became the secretary of a UN committee specialised on the effects of atomic 
radiations, then head of department at Euratom, finally entered the Commission in 1973 as D-G. Sir 
Ronald Grierson, A German and British citizen, studied in the Lycée Pasteur in Paris, at the Highgate 
School, London, and the Balliol College, Oxford, directed several private companies before his 
appointment as D-G of Industrial Affairs. Michael Shanks, also a student of the Balliol College, a 
long-time correspondent of the Financial Times, was manager of a private company before he entered 
the Commission as D-G for Social Affairs and Employment in 1973. While the other British D-Gs 
definitely do not have such atypical profiles, few are those who have been trained in law, like their 
Danish and Irish counterparts, among whom many are economists. The enlargement to Swedes, 
Austrians and Finns reinforced this tendency by ensuring the promotion of similar profiles for 
positions of Directors-General, with a prevalence of economists, a few political science or technical 
profiles, and almost no jurists. 
This is also the case of the new member states. The top officials from new countries, with two 
exceptions (Maria Bohata, Czech, D-G Eurostat, has a PhD in economy, Jan Truszczynski, Polish, has 
degrees in international law and international economics, DD-G Enlargement), have very different 
profiles. They do not possess bureaucratic capital a priori and often distinguish themselves by 
technical capital (corresponding to the positions that were opened to them) and an international 
dimension. 
These three phases of enlargement were not compensated by the integration of Spain, Portuguese 
and Greece in the 1980s, whose citizens have more “mixed” profiles, with very internationalised, 
“Euro-compatible” profiles. 
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Frequency  
Row Pct  
 
Table of nationality by studies 
Etudes 
Nationality 
other law law+ eco - 
law -  
eco + eco  N/A  Total 
German 
5
13.51 
11
29.73 
4
10.81 
0
0.00 
14 
37.84 
3 
8.11 
37
  
Austrian 133.33 
0
0.00 
0
0.00 
0
0.00 
1 
33.33 
1 
33.33 
3
  
Belgian 318.75 
4
25.00 
1
6.25 
0
0.00 
4 
25.00 
4 
25.00 
16
  
British 1647.06 
3
8.82 
0
0.00 
0
0.00 
5 
14.71 
10 
29.41 
34
  
Danish 00.00 
0
0.00 
0
0.00 
0
0.00 
3 
42.86 
4 
57.14 
7
  
Spanish 213.33 
5
33.33 
1
6.67 
1
6.67 
3 
20.00 
3 
20.00 
15
  
Finnish 1100.00 
0
0.00 
0
0.00 
0
0.00 
0 
0.00 
0 
0.00 
1
  
French 515.63 
8
25.00 
4
12.50 
5
15.63 
9 
28.13 
1 
3.13 
32
  
Greek 00.00 
2
40.00 
0
0.00 
0
0.00 
2 
40.00 
1 
20.00 
5
  
Hungarian 1100.00 
0
0.00 
0
0.00 
0
0.00 
0 
0.00 
0 
0.00 
1
  
Irish 350.00 
0
0.00 
0
0.00 
0
0.00 
3 
50.00 
0 
0.00 
6
  
Italian 1026.32 
13
34.21 
1
2.63 
0
0.00 
7 
18.42 
7 
18.42 
38
  
Luxemburger 125.00 
2
50.00 
0
0.00 
1
25.00 
0 
0.00 
0 
0.00 
4
  
Dutch 213.33 
6
40.00 
2
13.33 
0
0.00 
2 
13.33 
3 
20.00 
15
  
Portuguese 250.00 
0
0.00 
0
0.00 
0
0.00 
1 
25.00 
1 
25.00 
4
  
Slovenian 1100.00 
0
0.00 
0
0.00 
0
0.00 
0 
0.00 
0 
0.00 
1
  
Swedish 00.00 
0
0.00 
0
0.00 
0
0.00 
2 
100.00 
0 
0.00 
2
  
Swedish/Finnish 1100.00 
0
0.00 
0
0.00 
0
0.00 
0 
0.00 
0 
0.00 
1
  
Czech 00.00 
0
0.00 
0
0.00 
0
0.00 
1 
100.00 
0 
0.00 
1
  
Total  54 54 13 7 57 38 223 
Frequency Missing = 24  
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Finally, while the foundations of Europe were upheld by jurists, political supports have now 
shifted. This is especially the case of the structure of the college of Commissioners and its Presidents. 
A comparison of the appointments between the Hallstein and Delors presidencies clearly shows how 
the Presidents were able to surround themselves with agents whose properties were similar to their 
own. It is thus likely that the socio-morphological evolution of the college, which since 1996 and 
especially the latest Commission, where mostly economist commissioners from new member countries 
have gained a significant influence, does not favour a return of jurists. 
As a conclusion, the case of the Commission highlights a specific dimension of legal capital and its 
transformations. It does not show that this capital has no more value, but that it is no longer the 
dominant instrument of certification of bureaucrat competences, including within international 
bureaucracies although, with the figure of the diplomat jurist (Sacriste, Vauchez, 2007), those seemed 
to be places where the figure of the jurist as servant of the State forged in Prussia still prevailed. This 
does not preclude law from having an influence within the Commission, and the latter’s role as 
guardian of the treaties still represents an important part of its top officials’ symbolic capital. The 
practices of the officials are also still very much revolve around law-based interpretations of policies. 
The Commission has also contributed not only to the construction of Community law, but also to its 
dissemination and social legitimisation through the support of Community jurists. This does not either 
preclude the Commission from representing a place or hub of networks enabling specifically European 
forms of capitalisation or re-capitalisation for national jurists. This strategy was however driven more 
by the general undertaking of construction of positions of power by this bourgeoisie de robe and the 
construction of its immediate environment than by jurists as such and, especially, for law. Jurists have 
weight, but especially the small group of “law-makers” or outside non-jurisdictional institutions, such 
as law firms. This makes a general topography of the whole legal field all the more valuable.  
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